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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NEWSPAPER AGENCY CORPORATION, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
AUDITING DIVISION, UTAH STATE 
TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 940694-CA 
Priority No. 14 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
INTRODUCTION 
Newspaper Agency Corporation (NAC) submits this brief 
in reply to the arguments advanced by the Auditing Division of 
the Utah State Tax Commission (Division) in its responsive brief. 
The basic theme of those arguments is that the Division and the 
Commission enjoy nearly unfettered discretion to determine the 
scope of the manufacturer's sales tax exemption contained in Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-12-104(16) (Supp. 1994), notwithstanding contrary 
decisions of this Court and the Utah Supreme Court which make 
clear that an agency's rules and actions must be consistent with 
the plain language of the governing statutes. In short, in 
arguing that the Commission's decision should be upheld, the 
Division refuses to apply, and in most instances even to 
acknowledge, settled principles of administrative law which 
clearly limit an agency's discretion in its interpretation and 
application of a governing statute. 
The Division's arguments are addressed below, but not 
in the same order in which they appear in its brief. 
ARGUMENT 
REPLY TO THE DIVISION'S POINT I 
CONTRARY TO THE DIVISION'S ASSERTION# THE 
DEFERENTIAL (REASONABLENESS) STANDARD OF 
REVIEW IS NOT THE ONLY STANDARD APPLICABLE TO 
THIS COURT'S REVIEW OF THE COMMISSION'S 
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE 
GOVERNING STATUTE; THE NONDEFERENTIAL 
(CORRECTION-OF-ERROR) STANDARD ALSO APPLIES 
In discussing the applicable standard of review, the 
Division correctly states that the Commission's interpretation of 
the "new or expanding operations" and "normal operating 
replacements" language in Utah Code Amu § 59-12-104(16) (Supp. 
1989) (amended 1991, 1992, and 1994) is reviewed for 
reasonableness — a deferential standard of review — because 
section 59-12-104(16) grants the Commission discretion to define 
those terms. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1)(b) (Supp. 1994); 
Putvin v. State Tax Comm'n. 837 P.2d 589, 591 (Utah App. 1992). 
But, the Commission's interpretation of the crucial 
phrase "any manufacturing facility in Utah" in section 59-12-
104(16) is reviewed for correctness — a nondeferential standard 
of review. That is because the statute does not give the 
Commission discretion to define those terms. See Mt. Olympus 
Waters v. State Tax Comm'n, 877 P.2d 1271, 1272 (Utah App. 1994). 
The Division fails to note this distinction, erroneously claiming 
that this Court must deferentially review the Commission's 
interpretation of section 59-12-104(16) in all aspects. 
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REPLY TO THE DIVISIONS POINT III 
THE DIVISION FAILS TO ANALYZE THE CENTRAL 
ISSUE OF WHETHER THE COMMISSION'S RULE MAY 
LIMIT THE SALES TAX EXEMPTION TO PURCHASES OF 
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT FOR A NEW PLANT AT A 
NEW LOCATION
 # IN LIGHT OF CONTRARY LANGUAGE 
IN THE GOVERNING STATUTE 
A central issue in this case is whether the 
Commission's rule (Utah Admin. Code R865-19-85S.A.3(b) (1994)) 
may# in light of the plain language of section 59-12-104(16)# 
limit the sales tax exemption to purchases of machinery and 
equipment for use in a new plant at a new location, as opposed to 
a new plant built, in whole or in part, on the site of its 
predecessor. The Division fails to analyze this critical issue, 
content to state the obvious — i.e., the rule focuses on whether 
the manufacturing activities are begun at a "new location." 
The Division has not even attempted to draw a rational 
distinction between the new plant/existing site scenario and the 
new plant/new site scenario; therefore, it must be assumed the 
Division is unable to conceive of one. Further, the Division 
makes no effort to square the rule's new location requirement 
with the plain meaning of section 59-12-104(16)'s "new or 
expanding" and "any manufacturing facility" language. Nor does 
it come to grips with the settled principle that an agency/s 
rules must be consistent with the governing statutes, whether or 
not the agency has the discretion to define statutory terms. 
In this vein, noticeably absent from the Division's 
brief is any analysis of the following key cases, which were 
thoroughly discussed in NAC's opening brief: Sanders Brine 
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Shrimp v. State Tax Comm'n. 846 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1993); Union 
Pacific R. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 842 P. 2d 876 (Utah 1992); and 
Mt. Olympus Waters v. State Tax Comm'n. 877 P.2d 1271 (Utah App. 
1994). It must be assumed that the Division's silence reflects 
its inability to reconcile the Commission's decision in the 
instant case with either the analysis or the result in any of 
those cases. 
Finally, the Division argues that "[e]ven if the word 
'location' were deleted from R865-19-85S.A.3(b), NAC could not 
qualify as a new or expanding operation . . . since it did not 
create a 'new' plant, but simply upgraded its prior operation." 
Br. of Appellee at 19. That argument is not supported by the 
record or the Commission's findings. 
If the word "location " were deleted from subsection 
(b), the rule would allow the tax exemption where manufacturing 
activities are "begun in a new physical plant in Utah." No one 
could reasonably conclude that NAC did not construct a "new 
physical plant" given the following findings of the Commission: 
11. NAC constructed and re-equipped the 
Regent Street plant during the audit period. 
The existing building was expanded by 
approximately 25% on property already owned 
by NAC. Forty percent of the building's 
walls were rebuilt. A new foundation was 
built to support new printing presses. New 
plumbing, electrical, ventilation, and 
cooling systems, as well as dust and ink 
collection systems, were installed. 
12. NAC also purchased additional 
adjacent land for loading docks and truck 
parking. 
13. NAC's cost to reconstruct its plant 
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was 95% of what an entirely new building 
would have cost. The only significant saving 
was NAC's ability to use land which it 
already owned. 
14. Before reconstruction, the Regent 
Street plant contained two letter presses and 
one offset press. The letter presses were 
removed from service, the existing offset 
press was reconfigured, and two new offset 
presses with supporting machinery and 
equipment were added. The cost of equipment 
for the Regent Street plant was 80% of the 
cost to equip a new plant. 
decision at 3-4 (R. 22-23). 
In sum, the Division, like the Commission, offers no 
justification for the new location requirement contained in 
subsection (b) of the Commission's rule. Indeed, the plain 
language of the governing statute, when given its usually 
accepted meaning (as an agency must under clear precedent from 
this Com i drill the Utah Supreme Court), precludes such a 
limitation. NAC's new plant , therefore, meets the new plant 
requirement under a properly construed subsection |i ), inu NAC is 
entitled l '»*•' statutory sales tax exemption. 
REPLY TO THE DIVISION#S POINTS II AND III 
THE DIVISION IGNORES SUBSTANTIAL, UNDISPUTED 
RECORD EVIDENCE IN ARGUING THAT NAC DID NOT 
QUALIFY FOR SALES TAX EXEMPTION BECAUSE 
CONSTRUCTION OF ITS NEW PLANT WAS A MERE 
"RENOVATION" AND THAT THE NEW OFFSET PRESSES 
AND SUPPORTING EQUIPMENT WERE "NORMAL 
OPERATING REPLACEMENTS" 
Throughout Points II and III of its brief, the Division 
characterizes NAC/s construction r* ts new plant as a mere 
"renovation" and NAC's new offset presses and suppc 
equipment as "norma.I operating replacements." By employing these 
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characterizations, the Division seeks to justify the Commission's 
denial of section 59-12-104(16)'s sales tax exemption to NAC. 
The flaw in this approach is exposed by a simple examination of 
the record evidence, which does not support either the Division's 
characterizations or the Commission's ultimate conclusion that 
NAC's purchases of machinery and equipment were subject to sales 
tax. 
In short, the Division confuses the issue by 
substituting labels for analysis. Before the Commission, NAC did 
not offer a set of its own labels. Rather, NAC brought in an 
undisputed newspaper facility expert, Kenneth Harding, who 
presented detailed, fact-based analysis which established that 
NAC's new plant was just that. With reference to explanatory 
charts and flow diagrams, Harding demonstrated that when analyzed 
from either a production flow or work process standpoint, NAC had 
established a "new operation." 
A. The Division's Characterization Of NAC#s 
New Plant Project As A "Renovation" Is Not 
Based On A Realistic Evaluation Of The 
Evidence 
Although the Commission's decision never uses the term, 
the Division insists on characterizing NAC's new plant project as 
a "renovation." It does so in an effort to justify the 
Commission's conclusion that NAC did not satisfy subsection (a) 
of R865-19-85S.A.3., which allows the statutory sales tax 
exemption where manufacturing activities "are substantially 
different in nature, character, or purpose from prior 
activities." This characterization is "not based on a realistic 
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evaluation o± the evidence." Jensen v. State Tax Comm'n, 835 
P.2d 965, 970 (Utah 1992) (holding that the Commission's finding 
was not supported by substantial evidence). 
The usual meaning of "renovate" is "to make fresh or 
sound again, as though new; I to] clean up, replace worn and 
broken parts in, repair, etc." Webster#s New World Dictionary 
1203 (2nd ed. 1984). A common synonym for renovation is 
"renewal." Id. "Renovation" plainly implies a return to a 
prior, newer condition which is not in need o^  repairs. 
Although NAC's new plant concededly is in a "newer" 
state than was its former plant, it is not simply a newer 
replacement of its predecessor. The former plant anil its letter 
presses were not worn out, broken, or in need of repair; they 
were in good condition and capable of continuing NAC's newspaper 
printing operation indefinitely. NAC's new plant is in c in i i i; I y 
new system with dramatically increased capacity and production. 
Activities that were impracticable prior to construction of the 
new plant — competitive commercial printing, preprints, 
advertisements special formats, and target marketing — are 
now significant, regular activities of NAC. In labelling NAC's 
project a "renovation," the Division fails either to acknowJedge 
or to give ciue weight to these critical, uncontroverted facts. 
An additional problem with the Division's use of the 
term "renovation" is that the word lacks precision in the 
context of determining whether something is a "new or expanding 
operation." As Kenneth Harding, the architect in charge of the 
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NAC project, explained at the hearing before the Commission: 
I think ["renovation" is] kind of a common 
term, that any time anyone embarks on a 
project that to a great degree maintains the 
existing walls or does something internally 
[to] a building, it's called a renovation or 
remodernization. I think that's a term 
typically used in the industry by architects 
and lay people as well. And it really has 
nothing to do with the intensity of what's 
happening. I mean, you could, in essence, 
change one office and have a modernization or 
renovation or gut it and start over and it's 
still a renovation. So I think it's a term 
that's kind of hinged with staying on the 
existing side and existing exterior shell of 
the building. 
(T. 37-38). Having noted the definitional problem with 
"renovation," Harding concluded that NAC's new plant is, "from a 
production and process standpoint, . . . a new operation" (T. 
38). The Division presented no contrary expert evidence. 
At bottom, the Division, as was the Commission, is 
obligated to consider all the record evidence in analyzing the 
question whether NAC's new plant engages in the substantially 
different activities required by R865-19-85S.A.3(a). The 
Division does not do this. It fails to realistically evaluate 
all the evidence presented to the Commission, which firmly 
established that since the construction of its new plant, NAC has 
engaged in numerous activities that are substantially different 
from its traditional newspaper printing activities. The Division 
attempts to obscure this fact by using the convenient, but 
imprecise, label "renovation" in its incomplete review of the 
record evidence. 
Finally, the Division's argument that, to satisfy 
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subsection (a), a manufacturer's new activities must "materially 
change the nature, character, or purpose of the activities 
conducted by NAC," Br. of Appellee at 23, is contrary the 
plain language of both the rule and the governing statute. There 
is nothing in subsection (a) which requires that activities of a 
substantially different nature, character, or purpose must 
displace the primary activities of a manufacturer (in this case, 
printing, advertising, and circulation services for two daily 
newspapers). Moreover, such a construction conflicts directly 
with the plain meaning of the statutory language "new or 
expanding operations." § 59-12-104(16) (emphasis added),1 
B. The Division Fails To Analyze Whether The 
Machinery And Equipment NAC Purchased For Its 
New Plant "Replace\d] Machinery Or Equipment 
Of A Similar Nature," As Set Forth In The 
Commission's Rule Defining "Normal Operating 
Replacements" 
Throughout Points II and III of its brief, the Division 
insists that the machinery and equipment NAC purchased im its 
new plant were "normal operating replacements" and therefore not 
tax exempt. But, the Division fails even to cite the controlling 
language of the Commission's rule defining "normal operating 
replacements," and does not analyze the facts of this case in 
light of that rule. 
In deciding that NAC did not meet the third alternative 
test for "new or expanding operation" set forth in subsection (c) 
1
 The Division's argument appears to be the product of its 
erroneous reading of the statutory phrase "new or expanding 
operations" to mean "new and expanding operations." See Br. of 
Appellee at 15 18. 
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of R865-19-85S.A.3, the Commission stated that "[i]n substance, 
machinery and equipment that expands capacity satisfies the 'new 
and [sic] expanding operation' requirement only if the machinery 
and equipment does not replace existing machinery or equipment of 
a similar nature." Comm'n Decision at 14 (R. 33). Thus, the 
central issue, and that which is addressed in NAC's opening 
brief, is whether the Commission's interpretation and application 
of R865-19-85S.A.6's "of a similar nature" language2 are in 
harmony with the plain meaning of the statutory terms "normal 
operating replacements." 
The Division never addresses this central issue, 
lumping its discussion of the normal operating replacement 
exception with R865-19-85S.A.3(a)'s unrelated and independent 
requirement that manufacturing activities be "substantially 
different in nature, character, or purpose from prior 
activities." Therefore, NAC's arguments concerning the 
Commission's improper interpretation and application of R865-19-
85S.A.3(c) stand unchallenged at the close of briefing. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments and those contained in 
NAC's opening brief, this Court should reverse the Commission's 
denial of the statutory sales tax exemption to NAC on purchases 
2
 R865-19-85S.A.6 defines "normal operating replacements" as 
"machinery or equipment which replaces existing machinery or 
equipment of a similar nature, even if the use results in 
increased plant production or capacity." Utah Admin. Code R865-
19-85S.A.6 (1994). 
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of machinery and equipment for its new plant• 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 3 day of January, 1995• 
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